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Abstract
This paper develops a new measure of US scal policy shocks that intends to avoid the
anticipation problem a¤ecting conventional measures, being also arguably free from endo-
geneity. The shocks are intended to capture changes to the component of anticipated scal
policy that is exogenous to economic developments. Key economic variables such as output
and interest rates respond quickly and signicantly to a realization of the estimated shock
and, in the rst part of the sample, 1969-1988, in a way consistent with the Keynesian prior.
In contrast, over the period 1989-2008 the e¤ects are at odds with that prior, with scal
loosening producing contractionary impacts.
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1 Introduction
The empirical investigation of the e¤ects of scal policy shocks has to cope with two well known
issues: endogeneity and anticipation. The rst one is not specic to scal policy; it also arises,
for instance, in the identication of monetary policy shocks. Well known work by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) on the identication of scal policy shocks tackled endogeneity through
the application of the structural VAR methodology. This approach requires that identication
assumptions are made and the calibration of scal elasticities to macroeconomic variables. While
these assumptions and calibrated gures are by their very nature debatable, the key objection
one can raise in relation to structural VARs in this context has to do with anticipation (see, for
instance, Leeper et al. (2008)). This issue is largely specic to the way scal policy in conducted.
Important changes to taxes and spending have to pass a legislative process before they are signed
into law and often more time elapses until they are actually implemented. Markets and agents
get information about future scal policy and it is plausible that they react to this information.
Potential anticipation and/or endogeneity problems have prevented empirical analyses to
come to widely accepted conclusions about the impact of scal policy on the economy. As a
result such analyses have given an insu¢ cient contribution to reduce the uncertainty stemming
from the divergent theoretical views in the eld. The objective of this paper is to develop a shock
measure that is relatively less a¤ected by these shortcomings, so that it can be more credibly
used to assess the impacts of government budget on the economy.
The shock measure put forward takes advantage of the information about anticipated scal
policy contained in the budget projections regularly announced by the O¢ ce of Management
and Budget (OMB). However, not the full information content of these projections is suitable
to be used to assess the macroeconomic impacts of policy. Budget projections respond to the
information that forecasters have about current and future economic developments, embodied in
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the macroeconomic assumptions. The same holds for similar information on which policymakers
base their decisions. Another source of endogeneity comes from the fact that budget forecasts
are anchored on the outturn gures for a base year.
In a rst step, I purge the scal forecasts from these endogenous elements by regressing
them on an information set including real time data and macroeconomic assumptions. The
residual of this regression yields the exogenous component of the forecast. This quantity can be
computed throughout the sequence of forecast announcements for a given scal year, and my
shock measure is based on its revision between two such consecutive announcements. Typically
releases include at least projections for the current and budget scal years, and I am able to
compute two corresponding shock series. The methodology followed has similarities to the one
used in Romer and Romer (2004) to derive monetary policy shocks.
I collected information about all releases of budget projections made by OMB I could track
down over the period 1968-2008. For each of them, I further collected information about the
underlying macroeconomic assumptions and real-time contemporary data. The fact that most
of the releases can be precisely dated, generally to the day, allows me to investigate the impact of
the shocks using data at a higher frequency (monthly and weekly) than usually in this context.
This study is not the rst one to use budget forecasts to capture anticipated scal policy, but
it is the rst one to derive from them a measure of shocks that can be broadly employed to
assess its e¤ects. Previous literature initiated by Wachtel and Young (1987)1 considered simply
the overall revision to the forecast between announcements and mostly cared only about their
immediate (daily) impact on interest rates.
The key ndings can be summarized as follows: revisions to anticipated scal policy, as
measured by the change in the exogenous component of the forecast, matter for the economy
and their e¤ects have changed substantially over the last decades. The usable sample includes
1Other contributions along these lines are, for instance, Thorbecke (1993), Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994),
Kitchen (1996) and, more recently, Laubach (2003).
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the years from 1969 to 2008, and I split it into two subsamples: 1969-1988 and 1989-2008.
The evidence I get in the rst subsample is very much consistent with the standard Keynesian
predictions. Positive decit shocks rise simultaneously interest rates and output. Changes to
anticipated exogenous taxes (net of transfers) and spending, considered separately, have also
e¤ects in line with such predictions. In the second half of the sample the impacts are quite
the opposite. In particular, revisions to anticipated scal policy which signal loosening have
a contractionary impact on economic activity and reduce interest rates. Such results resemble
the so-called «expansionary scal contraction» hypothesis, which emphasizes the role of agents
expectations on the impact of scal policy. If agents regard, say, a tax cut as unsustainable,
this may revert the impact it would otherwise cause. The possibility that scal policy in the US
had non-conventional e¤ects in the nineties and more recently has appeared often in the popular
debate, and occasionally also in the academic literature. Nevertheless, this paper probably
presents the strongest evidence of a major structural break so far. In addition, results imply
that perverse e¤ects on output occur under less extreme conditions than usually associated with
expansionary scal contractions - given the budgetary situation in the US over the 1989-2008
period.
My ndings do not support the view that revisions to anticipated scal policy a¤ect aggregate
demand only indirectly, via the impact on long-term interest rates. Positive decit shocks work
in the rst and second subsamples, respectively, as positive and negative aggregate demand
shocks. This is evidence against the argument - very common in the popular debate - that the
expansionary impact of scal policy tightening comes about through a fall in interest rates.
The response of the federal funds rate to scal shocks appears generally in line with the
endogenous reaction of monetary authorities to the ensuing deviation of output from trend. No
indication of an accommodating behavior is found. The long-term interest rate accompanies the
short rate in a muted way, suggesting some role of the expectations channel. In view of this
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last point, I carry out a deeper investigation of the long interest rate response. In particular, I
search for an impact of scal policy on the risk premium - which the evidence does not support,
although this sort of investigation is contingent on the di¢ culties in estimating unobservable
components of the long rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses features of the budget forecasting
process that are relevant to reach an appropriate shock measure. Section 3 describes the deriva-
tion of the shocks and covers aspects related to the data. Section 4 provides a descriptive
analysis of the estimated shocks series. The rest of the paper is devoted to the presentation of
empirical results. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the reactions of output, short-term and long-term
interest rates in the wake of scal shocks. Section 7 takes up a more detailed investigation of
impacts of scal policy on long-term bond yields. Section 8 makes some concluding remarks.
2 The budget forecasts
This paper proxies anticipated scal policy through the projections released by OMB. There are
two main releases of budget forecasts by this agency throughout the year: at the time of the
submission of the Presidents Budget in January or February, and around July or August in the
Mid-Session Review. The Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) releases its own forecast shortly
after OMB, respectively, in the Economic and Budget Outlook and Economic and Budget Out-
look: An Update. Table 1 presents the chronology of OMB announcements for which information
was gathered. They start with the FY 1969 Budget (January 1968) and end with the FY 2009
Budget (February 2008). The FY 1969 Budget was the rst one employing the so-called «new
budget concepts» which dened the methodology used in the compilation of budget data that
is, by and large, still in place today. Prior to mid-eighties there used to be additional releases of
forecasts (this still occurs occasionally nowadays, as at times of presidential transition). In the
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earlier years of the sample, some of these releases were not backed by a formal document. As to
the sources used, beyond the budgetary documents and the Economic Report of the President,
the Economic Indicators prepared on a monthly basis by the Council of Economic Advisers was
a valuable source to keep track and collect information of OMB releases over the time span
considered.2
I work with OMBs projections for a number of reasons. A key reason is that, while these
reect the proposals of the administration before they have been signed into law, CBOs pro-
jections are usually «current-services» estimates taking current law as a benchmark.3 Since
the emphasis of the shock measure put forward is precisely to capture unanticipated policy, it
is crucial that the forecasts on which it is based embody policy proposals at the earliest stage
possible. At the end of the day not all proposals are enacted, this depending on aspects such
as the White House and the Congress being controlled by the same party. Nevertheless, it is
preferable to be protected against the risk of missing the right timing, even at the cost of taking
on board some intentions that did not survive the legislative process. Moreover, the Presidents
proposals subsequently dropped may still have inuenced the behavior of market participants
who basically face the same uncertainty as forecasters do.
A second reason for preferring OMBs projections is that the respective series of announce-
ments is longer than the one by CBO, which starts in the second half of the seventies. The
length of the sample is important from the viewpoint of documenting structural changes in the
e¤ects of scal policy. A third argument is that the releases by OMB come rst. Assuming
that both agenciesprojections have a similar information content (in particular, abstracting
2This study was made solely on the basis of resources available on the web. The US Budgets
for FYs 1963-1986, the Economic Report of the President since 1947, and the Economic Indicators
since 1948 are available from the Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research, FRASER
(http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/). The US Budgets since FY 1996 and the Mid-Session Review since FY 1998 are
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/. CBO documents relating to the budget published over the
years can be found at http://www.cbo.gov/publications/.
3Although CBO typically presents an own re-estimation of Presidents proposals in the documents produced
concurrently with the submission of the budget.
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from the current law vs proposed law issue mentioned above), one may expect a more precise
estimate of impacts on the basis of OMB data. Nevertheless, as they are made public only with
a couple of weeks di¤erence and given the persistence of the shocks as estimated below, one set
of announcements is likely to pick up the e¤ects of the other anyway.4 Finally, working with
OMBs projections is also convenient in that one can pinpoint the respective release date very
precisely.
A possible argument against using OMB data is that market participants may have less con-
dence in them, as this agency is comparatively more susceptible to political inuences. Note
that, even if this is the case, the precise objectives it pursues are open to debate. Blackley and
DeBoer (1993) put forward a number of models that may govern the behavior of the agency,
which imply di¤erent outcomes in terms of a possible bias in the projections (see a brief dis-
cussion at the end of Section 3.1). In practice, studies that examined assumptions and budget
projections of OMB and CBO as to accuracy and other properties (e.g. Plesko (1988), Auer-
bach (1999) and Cohen and Follete (2003)) could not nd signicant di¤erences. The regular
assessments published by CBO of its own macroeconomic forecasting record vis-a-vis that of
OMB and blue chip consensus (an average of private-sector forecasters) also point to the same
conclusions.5 I conclude that the information content of OMB projections is essentially as good
as that of the competitors, in spite of the institutional constraints a¤ecting its activity. The
picture that emerges from the analysis in Auerbach (dealing with budget receipts) is one of
«consensus» estimates of the two government agencies, from which even private-sector forecast-
4 Indeed, studies such as Wachtel and Young (1987) and Thorbecke (1993) that worked with current-year
announcements by the two agencies reported that one could not include both sets in the same regression on
colinearity grounds.
5CBO computes simple indicators of accuracy (root mean square error, RMSE) and bias (mean error, ME),
considering the results for the forecasts made early in a given calendar year for that year and the following one.
Taking as an example the period 1982-2004, Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2006), the RMSE for real GDP growth
is 1.2, 1.2 and 1.3 percent, and the ME -0.4, -0.5 and -0.3 percent, respectively, for CBO, Blue Chip and OMB.
For CPI ination, the RMSE is 0.9 percent for all sources, and the ME 0.4, 0.4 and 0.2 percent, respectively.
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ers tend not to deviate much. Consistently with this, Foster and Miller III (2000) point out
that forecasters in both agencies often maintain a behind-the-scenes dialog in order to minimize
public disagreement, reducing the scope for pure partisanship.
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Table 1: Announcements of budget projections by OMB/Bureau of the Budget 1968-2008
Date Event cFY Date Event cFY Date Event cFY
68Jan29 FY69 Budget 68 79Jan22 FY80 Budget 79 92Feb18 FY93 Budget, Sup. 92
68Sep Summer Review 69* 79Mar Curr. Bud. Est. 79 92Jul24 Mid-Sess. Review 92
69Jan15 FY70 Budget 69 79Jul12 Mid-Sess. Review 79 93Jan6 Budget baselines 93*
69Apr15 Review FY70B 69 79Jul31 Mid-Sess.Rev., rev. 79 93Feb17 Prel. FY94 Budget 93
69May 69 79Oct25 Treas./OMB Stat. 80* 93Apr8 FY94 Budget 93
69Sep17 Summer Review 70* 80Jan28 FY81 Budget 80 93Sep1 Mid-Sess. Review 93
70Feb2 FY71 Budget 70 80Mar31 FY81 Budget rev. 80 94Feb7 FY95 Budget 94
70May19 70 80Jul21 Mid-Sess. Review 80 94Jul14 Mid-Sess. Review 94
71Jan29 FY72 Budget 71 81Jan15 FY82 Budget 81 95Feb6 FY96 Budget 95
72Jan24 FY73 Budget 72 81Mar10 FY82 Budget Rev. 81 95Jul31 Mid-Sess. Review 95
72Jun Mid-Sess. Review 72 81Jul15 Mid-Sess. Review 81 96Feb5 FY97 Budget 96
72Sep 73* 82Feb8 FY83 Budget 82 96Mar19 FY97 Budget Rev. 96
73Jan29 FY74 Budget 73 82Apr Curr. Budget Est. 82 96Jul16 Mid-Sess. Review 96
73May1 73 82Jul30 Mid-Session Review 82 97Feb6 FY98 Budget 97
73Jun1 73 83Jan31 FY84 Budget 83 97Sep5 Mid-Sess. Review 97
73Oct18 74* 83Apr Curr. Bud. Est. 83 98Feb2 FY99 Budget 98
73Nov15 74* 83Jul25 Mid-Sess. Review 83 98May26 Mid-Sess. Review 98
74Feb4 FY75 Budget 74 84Feb1 FY85 Budget 84 99Feb1 FY00 Budget 99
74May13 74 84Apr Curr. Bud. Est. 84 99June28 Mid-Sess. Review 99
74Jun12 74 84Aug15 Mid-Sess. Review 84 00Feb7 FY01 Budget 00
74Nov26 75* 85Feb4 FY86 Budget 85 00Jun26 Mid-Sess. Review 00
75Feb3 FY76 Budget 75 85Apr15 Curr. Budget Est. 85 01Jan16 Budget baselines 01*
75Mar12 75 85Aug30 Mid-Sess. Review 85 01Feb28 Prel. FY02 Budget 01
75Apr18 75 86Feb5 FY87 Budget 86 01Apr9 FY02 Budget 01
75May30 75 86Aug6 Mid-Sess. Review 86 01Aug22 Mid-Sess. Review 01
76Jan21 FY77 Budget 76 87Jan5 FY88 Budget 87 02Feb4 FY03 Budget 02
76Mar25 Spring Update 76 87Aug17 Mid-Sess. Review 87 02Jul15 Mid-Sess. Review 02
76Jun24 76 88Feb18 FY89 Budget 88 03Feb3 FY04 Budget 03
76Jul16 Mid-Sess. Review 77* 88Jul28 Mid-Sess. Review 87 03Jul15 Mid-Sess. Review 03
77Jan17 FY78 Budget 77 89Jab9 FY90 Budget 89 04Feb2 FY05 Budget 04
77Feb22 FY78 Budget Rev. 77 89Feb9 FY90 Budget rev. 89 04Jul30 Mid-Sess. Review 04
77Apr Curr. Bud. Est. 77 89Jul18 Mid-Sess. Review 89 05Feb7 FY06 Budget 05
77Jul1 Mid-Sess. Review 77 90Jan29 FY91 Budget 90 05Jul13 Mid-Sess. Review 05
77Nov11 Rev. Outlay Est. 78* 90July16 Mid-Sess. Review 90 06Feb6 FY07 Budget 06
78Jan20 FY79 Budget 78 90Sep30 Budget Summit 91* 06Jul,11 Mid-Sess. Review 06
78Mar Curr. Bud. Est. 78 91Feb4 FY92 Budget 91 07Feb5 FY08 Budget 07
78Jul6 Mid-Sess. Review 78 91Jul15 Mid-Sess. Review 91 07Jul11 Mid-Sess. Review 07
78Oct27 Treas./OMB Stat. 79* 92Jan29 FY93 Budget 92 08Feb4 FY09 Budget 08
Notes: (a) Prior to 1971 the budget was prepared by the Bureau of the Budget. (b) Before FY 77 the scal year
ended on June, 30; it ends on September, 30, since then. (c) cFY refers to the current scal year at the time of
the announcement. (d) The announcements marked with * do not have projections for a budget year.
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Up to the end of the seventies, budget announcements used to include forecasts for the current
scal year, and also for the upcoming one after the submission of the Presidents Budget, i.e.
the budget year. A few announcements taking place between the start of a scal year (July,
1 prior to FY 77, and October, 1 afterwards) and the submission of a new budget - marked
with an * in Table 1 - had current-year projections only. From the beginning of the eighties
on, longer-term forecasts started to be reported including years not yet covered by a budget, on
a current law basis (the so-called budget baselines). This was initially done only for the main
releases, at time of the presentation of the budget. Currently the forecasting horizon stretches
over a ve-year period beyond the current year. Announcements after the beginning of a scal
year and before a new budget submission have become infrequent, being more or less restricted
to the budget baselines released by outgoing Presidents (see the January 1993 and January 2001
announcements)6.
My series of shocks is based on the revision to the exogenous component of the forecast
for a given year, from one announcement to the other. I consider two such revisions, for the
current and the budget scal years. Revisions for subsequent years are not taken into account.
A prosaic reason for doing so is data availability: they could be computed for a limited subset
of announcements in Table 1.
But there are conceptual reasons as well. The change in the exogenous component of the scal
forecast, controlling for base-year e¤ects and macroeconomic assumptions, is less meaningful for
years not yet covered by a budget. In the absence of the latter, such e¤ects and assumptions
are precisely the key factors driving the projections. Actually, as the forecasting horizon moves
into the future, they become more mechanical, approaching paths of scal variables consistent
with an equilibrium trajectory of the economy. Note also that budget-year shocks are likely to
be correlated with (and capture the impact of) changes in the exogenous part of forecasts for
6This became possible only since 1990. Before that, the outgoing presidents had to submit a budget (see
Congressional Research Service (2008)) and the incoming administration typically issued a revised budget.
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subsequent years. This happens because in the case of measures gradually implemented, for
instance a tax cut phased-in over a number of years, the initial (budget year) variation in scal
variables is usually a smaller version of the overall multi-year variation.
3 A new measure of shocks
3.1 Derivation
My objective is to construct a measure of shocks on the basis of scal forecasts that is, as far
as possible, free of endogeneity and anticipatory e¤ects. Forecasts of a given scal variable for
FY t can be modelled as being determined by the respective base-year value, for FY t  1, and
the estimated impact of developments a¤ecting the outcome in t, namely, changes in policy,
macroeconomic scenario and a multitude of other determining factors. On the revenue side,
these are factors a¤ecting the tax base such as consumer preferences, distribution of income or
the amount of capital gains. Some of them bear a relationship to the business cycle, but not
a strong enough one for their impact to be predictable on the basis of the core macroeconomic
assumptions. On the outlay side, those factors include demographic trends, composition of
health care demand and the behavior of administrators and beneciaries of spending programs.
The elements of the projected path of each scal variable that are endogenous to economic
developments cannot be used to assess policy impacts and must be taken out. A rst such
element relates to changes in macroeconomic assumptions, which show up in the gures as
forecasters seek to incorporate the e¤ect of automatic stabilizers. My revenue-side variable is
taxes net of transfers, thus including the items for which cyclical sensitivity is normally taken into
account when forecasts are drawn. The second component relates to changes in discretionary
systematic policy responding to useful information that policymakers (similarly to forecasters)
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may have about current and future macroeconomic developments.7 The last element is the
forecast component explained by previous years gure (which may be the outurn or itself a
forecast, depending on the number of steps ahead), on endogeneity grounds and to disentangle
each years specic shock.
More precisely, I regress the scal forecast announced at q for scal year s, as a percent
of GNP/GDP8, denoted generically by fq;s, on a constant, its value for the previous scal
year (fq;s 1) and key macroeconomic variables for the current and previous scal years. The
macroeconomic dataset encompasses real GNP/GDP growth (yq;s and yq;s 1), ination measured
by the GNP/GDP deator (pq;s and pq;s 1), and the 3-month Treasury bill rate (rq;s and rq;s 1).
I estimate
fq;s= 0+1fq;s 1 + 2yq;s + 3yq;s 1 + 4pq;s + 5pq;s 1+6rq;s + 7rq;s 1 + vq;s. (1)
The exogenous component is to the residual of this regression.9 This will essentially reect the
quantication by forecasters of changes relative to the previous scal year brought about by
policy measures unrelated to macroeconomic developments, and the other determining factors.
The shock referring to announcement q and scal year s is computed as v^q;s  v^q 1;s, the revision
to the exogenous component of the projection for year s between announcements q and q   1.
This revision may be due to, say, new policy measures announced in the interim period or pure
forecast errors. Such errors are part of the shock since it is based on changes in anticipated
7Budget projections are regressed on the forecastersinformation set. However, this should roughly coincide
with the policymakersone for measures taken around the budget, and give an acceptable approximation in the
remaining cases.
8From the FY 1993 Budget on, GDP replaced GNP as the central output measure.
9Each of the 114 announcements yields up to three observations for the regression. Two of these are the current-
and budget-year forecasts which exist, respectively for 114 and 103 announcements. The remaining observations
(10) come from the post-budget year projections in the announcements preceding the release of a new budget.
All these data points are stacked into one regression with 227 observations.
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gures rather than in the actual outturn. Market participants presumably make similar errors
which will inuence their decisions.
I am able to calculate gures for the shocks whenever two consecutive releases have projec-
tions for the same scal year. This is possible for all announcements (except the rst one) in
the case of current-year shocks, 113 observations in total, and for 72 announcements in the case
of budget-year shocks. I can however always compute the latter shocks after taking o¢ ce of a
new administration. These are likely to be particularly important as they signal major policy
changes.
I ran three regressions with the dependent variable in (1) given, respectively, by net taxes,
spending and decit, and computed two series of shocks from each of them. Since the predictions
of competing macro theories di¤er particularly as to the e¤ects of changes in taxes, it is important
to consider the two sides of the budget separately. It also informative to see how the impacts of
decit shocks reect the relative contributions stemming from each component.
The method used has similarities to calculating directly the revision to the forecast and then
regressing it on changes in the base year and macroeconomic assumptions. Econometrically this
corresponds to running a regression specied in di¤erences between consecutive announcements
for the same scal year. The dependent variable would be specied as fq;s = fq;s   fq 1;s
and likewise for the dependent and residual variables. Such a regression in di¤erences has less
observations than (1) and, in principle, worse properties as far as the precision of estimates
is concerned. Moreover, the methodological changes introduced over the 40 years covered by
the sample (for example, the recording of interest payments to trust funds by the Treasury
starting with the FY 84 Budget) a¤ect revisions from one announcement to the other, but not
the outcome of a regression in which each data point comes from the same announcement, since
revisions have typically been retropolated.
The econometric soundness of regression (1) relies on the exogeneity of macroeconomic as-
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sumptions to the production of budget forecasts. I believe this is a reasonable hypothesis since,
on the one hand, budget forecasting is a second stage in a process which starts by the elaboration
of the assumptions. Usually di¤erent people intervene at each stage (Auerbach (1999)). On the
other hand, Foster and Miller III (2000) make the point that budget scoring is «static» rather
than «dynamic» , in the sense that it tends to disregard feedback e¤ects on economic activity
of the policy proposals incorporated. The inclusion of the «lagged» forecast of the dependent
variable as a regressor in (1) rests on the equally plausible hypothesis that the forecasting process
is sequential, that is forecasts for FY t are determined after forecasts for FY t  1.
A nal aspect arises when the dependent variable in (1) is net taxes or spending (i.e. not
decit). It may happen that the projections of these two variables for the same scal year
react to each other. This may derive rstly from the use of the two sides of the budget for the
conduct of scal policy. For instance, spending programs may be nanced by the enactment
of revenue-raising measures or, conversely, unexpected revenue windfalls may trigger spending.
Moreover, budget rules as those stemming from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act may induce
such behavior by policymakers. This sort of factors is likely to create a positive correlation
between forecast revisions to the two sides of the budget.
A mutual feedback may also originate in the behavior and objectives of forecasters. As
pointed out by Blackley and DeBoer (1993), OMB may act as a budget cutter and produce
forecasts on the pessimistic side, or it may be optimistically biased so as to make the presidents
budget to look balanced. Both types of behavior could induce, in contrast to above, a negative
correlation between revisions. But forecasters can pursue other objectives, such as minimizing
the revision of key gures - maybe the decit target in this case. If so, they may tend to com-
pensate changes in one side of the budget with changes in the other, in particular if uncertainty
is still considerable.
In view of the simultaneous determination of spending and net tax forecasts, the inclusion of
14
one of these in the equation for the other would not be appropriate. Instead of relying, say, on an
arbitrary ordering, I prefer to estimate reduced-form equations from which both variables were
excluded. By implication, the residuals computed from the net tax and spending equations will
be correlated and so will be the shock measures based on them. Such correlations are further
examined in Section 4, and have to be taken into account in the empirical analysis.
3.2 Variable denition and data availability
The scal data used in the regressions are OMBs forecasts and real-time outturn data contem-
porary with the announcement. I consider both on- and o¤-budget items, i.e. the total budget,
which agencies and analysts usually consider to be the most meaningful for economic purposes
- see, for example, Congressional Budget O¢ ce (1992). This was also the denition adopted
by earlier studies. I collected data for overall receipts and outlays by function. Net taxes are
computed as total receipts minus outlays related to social transfers. This class of outlays cor-
responds, in terms of breakdown by function, to the item «health and income security» in the
initial years of the sample. It has been further broken down over time and includes currently the
items «health» , «medicare» , « income security» and «social security» . Expenditure comprises
the entries «defense» , « international» and «other (domestic)» . Note that these entries roughly
coincide in budget terminology with «discretionary spending» , and those that are netted out
from receipts with «mandatory spending» . I did not consider interest outlay projections because
they are basically determined by the past stock of debt and interest rate assumptions. Therefore,
it does not make sense to extract an exogenous component from them (much in the same way
as exogenous shocks in a structural VAR sense cannot originate in interest expenditure).
The nominal budget forecasts were standardized by nominal GNP/GDP, which appears to be
a suitable benchmark to proxy the perception by markets of the size of scal shocks. The nominal
GNP/GDP projection was calculated as the real-time gure at the date of the announcement,
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projected according to the real and price growth assumptions for the scal years ahead.
As to availability, I have real-time outturn gures and scal projections for the current-
and budget-years (when applicable) for all announcements. In contrast, the post-budget year
projections in the last announcement before the release of a new budget (needed to compute
the rst budget-year shock for a given year) are available only in the last years of the sample.
Availability constraints also a¤ect the macroeconomic assumptions underlying scal forecasts.
For the initial years, information about these assumptions was scant and not presented in a
systematic way: for instance, the breakdown of nominal GNP growth projections by price and
volume has to be taken from the discussion about economic prospects made in the Economic
Report of the President. The scope and presentation improved much starting with the FY 1976
Budget, after the enactment of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Nevertheless,
even for the subsequent period, a number of di¢ culties have to be overcome in order to come
to a macroeconomic dataset usable in regression (1). See the Appendix for more details on
availability issues.
4 Analysis of the shock series
Net tax and expenditure shocks for the current and budget scal years are depicted in Figure 1.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics, namely, the mean, the mean of absolute values and
the standard deviation. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that the computed net tax shocks have
been most of the time larger than expenditure ones, with the exception of the period 1990-1992.
In this period, the considerable and highly volatile outlays in the framework of the savings and
loan crisis (see contemporary budget analyses as, for instance, in Congressional Budget O¢ ce
(1992)) proved very di¢ cult to predict and gave rise to a sequence of abnormally large revisions
to expenditure projections. The average absolute shock is 0.30-0.35 percent of GDP for net taxes
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Figure 1: Estimated scal shocks
and 0.20-0.25 percent for spending but, excluding the years 1990-1992, this latter gure goes
down to about 0.15 percent. This reects a more active use of the revenue side of the budget to
conduct scal policy in the US, together with greater di¢ culties in predicting budget receipts
in comparison to outlays. For example, the impact of factors such as capital gains and the
distribution of income on the outturn of the personal income tax is very di¢ cult to anticipate.
In some occasions it is possible to pinpoint concrete legislative changes «behind» the esti-
mated net tax shocks. This is the case of the Tax reduction Act of 1975 (current year, February
1975), the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (budget year, March 1981), and the Jobs and
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Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (current year, February 2003). It is to a certain
extent surprising that the defense buildup at the beginning of the eighties hardly shows up in
spending shocks. This is partly due to the gradual nature of the military spending increase; for
instance, the Reagan budget for FY 1982 entailed an upward revision in the defense function
of only 0.15 percent of GDP for that year, in comparison to the budget previously submitted
by Carter. The subsequent military episode - the Gulf War - is reected on the large shocks of
July 1991 (a recomposition of spending between current and upcoming scal years), its impact
mixing in this occasion with that of deposit insurance spending. Some of the positive spikes of
the spending shock series in the 2000s are partly related to defense outlays.
A nal aspect in Table 2 is that on average current-year shocks are not smaller than their
budget-year counterparts. This is the opposite of what one would expect and indicates that
current-year forecasts are still surrounded by considerable uncertainty, in spite of their incorpo-
ration of more information.
Table 2: Shock series, descriptive statistics
current FY budget FY
mean mean abs. st.dev. mean mean abs. st.dev.
decit 0.18 0.52 0.68 0.14 0.33 0.45
net taxes -0.08 0.36 0.49 -0.03 0.29 0.39
spending 0.10 0.26 0.36 0.10 0.21 0.32
Notes: Based on 113 and 72 observations for current- and budget-year shocks, respectively.
I mentioned above studies dealing with the properties of government agenciesbudget fore-
casts. My shock measure should capture possible biases in the behavior of OMB as, for instance,
a consistent initial over- or under-quantication of the e¤ects of policy measures. The mean er-
ror in Table 2 indicates a slight overprediction in the case of net taxes and underprediction in
the case of expenditure; but the gures are small. They are equal or less then 0.1 percent of
GDP in absolute terms, and less than 1/3 of the respective standard deviations (much less for
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net taxes). These results are not supportive of a bias in OMBs projections and this ts in with
the conclusions reached by previous literature, which mostly considered the «raw revisions»
to the forecasts (i.e. the di¤erence in the gures for the same scal year between consecutive
announcements). The scope of such revisions is comparatively broader since base year and
macroeconomic assumptions are not controlled for. The corresponding statistics calculated for
the announcements in this study on the basis of raw revisions (not shown) point likewise to the
absence of a bias.
I now turn to the correlations between net tax and expenditure shocks for the same scal
year and current- and budget-year shocks for the same variable. The gures are displayed in
Table 3, which also shows the corresponding correlations for the raw revisions.
Table 3: Shock series, correlations
shocks raw revisions
(decitcFY , decitbFY ) -0.26 0.76
(net taxescFY , net taxesbFY ) -0.22 0.76
(expenditurecFY , expenditurebFY ) -0.55 0.40
(net taxescFY , expenditurecFY ) -0.24 -0.29
(net taxesbFY , expenditurebFY ) 0.15 -0.21
Notes: (a) cFY and bFY refer to current and budget scal years, respectively. (b) The correlations between
current- and budget-year shocks were calculated on the basis of 72 observations.
There are negative correlations between current- and budget-year shocks for decit, net
taxes and spending, in contrast with large positive correlations between raw revisions. These
positive correlations are easily explained by base-year e¤ects and revision to macroeconomic
assumptions that typically go in the same direction throughout the forecasting horizon, thus
being particularly large for net taxes which are a¤ected by the two e¤ects. When such e¤ects
are controlled for, a negative correlation emerges, in particular as far as spending is concerned
(-0.55). Note that this latter gure is driven upward by the two very large simultaneous current-
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year and budget-year shocks with opposite signs in July 91 and July 92. It goes down to -0.30
excluding them, becoming close to the gure for net tax shocks. Such a negative correlation
between changes in anticipated (exogenous) scal variables stems rstly from the temporary
nature of some policy measures: their budget impact is felt only or mostly within a given
scal year, leading to an o¤setting shock in the following one. Further, particularly in the
case of taxes, measures often have retroactive provisions, implying larger e¤ects in the year of
implementation. A third reason a¤ecting the outlay side has to do with uncertainty as to the
speed of implementation of programs; that is, money initially budgeted for a given year may
turn out to be spent in the subsequent one or vice versa.
The correlation between raw revisions to net taxes and expenditure for the same scal year
is negative. This suggests that whenever forecasts have been optimistic or pessimistic, this has
extended to the two sides of the budget, though there is no evidence of a repeated behavior
of either kind. The sign of the correlation is reverted when budget-year shocks are considered.
The reason could be that these reect comparatively more the behavior of policymakers than
the behavior of forecasters. One would expect, however, the same to happen also for their
current-year counterparts which is not the case.
5 A rst set of results: e¤ects on long-term interest rates
5.1 Empirical strategy
As a rst step I study how the long-term interest rate behaves following realizations of the
shock measure, in keeping with the traditional emphasis of empirical studies based on budget
forecasts. Given the likelihood of a quick response of nancial markets and to minimize temporal
aggregation which can blur the estimation of the impacts, I use weekly data. For instance, if
several shocks of di¤erent sizes and even signs occur during a given quarter, quarterly averages
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of interest rates will not capture properly their e¤ects. The empirical strategy followed here is
similar to the one in Romer and Romer (2004, 2007): if the policy measure is approximately
exogenous then its e¤ects can be assessed on the basis of reduced-form specications.
I start by estimating a univariate specication in which I regress the long-term rate on a
constant, own lags, and current and lagged values both of the shock whose e¤ects are being
measured and correlated shocks. It is necessary to control for the latter since they take place
at the same time as the shock whose e¤ects are being assessed. Specically, when measuring
the e¤ects of current-year shocks to net taxes, expenditure or decit, I control for budget-year
shocks to the same variable - and vice versa. In the case of net taxes and spending, in addition,
I control for same years shocks to the other. The long rate own lags are meant to control
for the normal dynamics of the variable. I include one year of lags, that is 52 weeks, in the
regressions. For example, the regressions estimated to assess, respectively, the e¤ects of changes
in anticipated decit, net taxes and spending for the current scal year are:
rt=+
P52
i=1 irt i +
P52
i=0 id^
cy
t i +
P52
i=0 id^
by
t i + "t (2)
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P52
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where rt is the weekly average of the daily 10-year constant maturity rate, d^
cy
t and d^
by
t denote
the current- and budget-year decits shocks, and the same notation applies to net tax (n^tcyt and
n^tbyt ) and expenditure (g^
cy
t and g^
by
t ) ones. When there is one announcement during week t these
shocks are computed, as explained, as the revision to the exogenous part of the projected scal
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variable; they are equal to 0 otherwise.10 The regression for measuring the e¤ects of budget-year
shocks is likewise (2) in the case of the decit; in the case of net taxes it is similar to (3), except
that one controls for g^byt instead of g^
cy
t , and in the case of spending it is similar to (4) but
controlling for n^tbyt instead of n^t
cy
t . All of the 6 regressions were estimated by OLS. The sample
period starts in the third week of September 1968, the rst one when current-year shocks assume
a nonzero value, and ends in the last week of March 2008 (the last announcement considered
is at the beginning of February 2008). This sample period is likewise taken in the regressions
measuring the e¤ects of budget-year shocks. Note that given the inclusion of 52 lags of the
series, the span of usable observations is one year shorter.
5.2 Results
Subsample sensitivity turned out to be a key nding. In particular, when the sample is broken
at the midpoint, end of 1988, there is a marked di¤erence in the responses of the economy in
the rst and second halves. While this breakpoint is not motivated by any precise event, it is
convenient given the possibility of a major change in the e¤ects of scal policy in the nineties in
the US (see, for instance, Auerbach (2002)). Specically, the tight scal policy implemented by
the Clinton administration is hypothesed to have strengthened economic performance. Results
are always split according to the subsamples 1969:09-1988:12 and 1989:01-2008:03.
Figures 2 and 3 show the dynamic multipliers for the long-term interest rate following,
respectively, current- and budget-year shocks with the size of 1 percent of GDP. This size is
about three times (in the case of net taxes) to four times (in the case of spending) bigger than
the average absolute shock presented in Section 4, although innovations of this magnitude did
occur in a number of occasions. The responses are in percentage points (annualized). One-
10As explained in Section 3, budget-year shocks cannot be computed for all announcements, in which case they
are set to zero. I am able to identify the week when the shock occurred in all but eight announcements. When
only the month could be identied, I assumed that the shock had occurred in the middle of it (i.e. during the 5
day-week including or following the 15th).
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Figure 2: Estimated impact of current-year scal shocks on the long-term interest rate
standard-deviation bands are shown as well.11
In the rst half of the sample positive decit shocks raise interest rates in line with conven-
tional wisdom while, in the second half, the e¤ects are the opposite. Such change in the sign
of responses is observed both for current- and budget-year horizons. When the subsample prior
to 1988:12 is taken, the e¤ect on the long-term rate builds up to a signicantly positive one
over the months following the revision to anticipated decit. A peak e¤ect of around 0.8 p.p. is
11The bands were obtained by a standard Monte-Carlo procedure, drawing 500 vectors of coe¢ cients from a
multivariate normal with mean and variance-covariance given by the OLS point estimates. A response for each
draw was computed, and then the standard deviation across all responses for each week after the shock, up to
the horizon considered.
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Figure 3: Estimated impact of budget-year scal shocks on the long-term interest rate
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attained nine months out in the case of current-year shocks while, for their budget-year coun-
terparts; the maximum e¤ect stands at about 1.8 p.p. and is reached after slightly more than
one year. Net tax and spending shocks have broadly symmetrical e¤ects, but the precise gures
vary depending on the forecasting horizon underlying them. Budget-year net tax innovations are
particularly powerful, with a peak impact of almost -2.0 p.p., which compares with around 1.0
p.p. for their spending counterparts. The trajectory of the long interest rate following the latter
is, in addition, a bit awkward - being initially positive, then reverting to zero and becoming
positive again. The response to decit innovations is comparatively more determined by net
taxes, given the larger size (Table 2) and, at least for budget-year shocks, the larger response
for this variable.
When the subsample after 1988:12 is considered, changes in anticipated net taxes have a
positive impact on the long-term rate, and in anticipated spending a negative one. The mag-
nitudes are smaller in absolute terms than in the rst half of the sample. Actually, in the case
of current-year shocks the responses are not signicant, since the horizontal axis is within the
one-standard-deviation bands. In the case of budget-year shocks, the impacts are a bit more
prominent, the peak e¤ects being around -1 p.p. for spending and 0.5 p.p. for net taxes.
Changes in anticipated scal variables for the budget-year produce a greater impact than the
corresponding changes for the current-year, particularly in the case of net taxes. There may be a
number of reasons explaining this. Firstly, new policy measures are likely to be predominant as
a source of budget-year shocks, while current-year ones should chiey originate in «ordinary»
forecast revisions due to additional information. One may conjecture that markets are more
sensitive to modications in policy. Secondly, budget-year shocks may be picking up the overall
impact of measures gradually implemented over a number of years (see discussion at the end
of Section 2). More generally, in specic occasions such as presidential transitions, they may
capture marketsbeliefs about the stance of scal policy in the coming years.
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How do these results compare with the previous literature on the e¤ects of scal policy
on interest rates? The literature on this topic is voluminous and studies surveying it such as
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) or, more recently, Gale and Orszag (2002) show that taken as
a whole it is rather inconclusive too. Older papers supported views ranging from signicant
positive e¤ects (e.g. Feldstein (1986)) to insignicant ones (e.g. Evans (1985, 1987)), though
Gale and Orszag stress that a large proportion of the latter use either current decits or a me-
chanical measure of future decits (as derived from a reduced-form VAR) which is an important
shortcoming. Studies that take into account anticipated policy through a measure of budget
forecasts (like in this paper) tend to nd a positive impact. This feature extends to more recent
papers not included in the aforementioned surveys: Laubach (2003) using OMBs and CBOs
decit projections concludes that higher anticipated decits increase interest rates, while Evans
and Marshall (2001) using a shock measure from a structural VAR get negligible e¤ects.
Among the papers documenting that scal policy a¤ects interest rates, Gale and Orszag
indicate, as a benchmark gure, an increase of around 0.5 p.p. in interest rates for 1 percent
of GDP decit shocks, and report that simulations of macroeconometric models yield average
e¤ects of a similar size. Since the majority of the papers surveyed are relatively old, using
samples ending in the early nineties at the latest, their ndings compare with my pre-1988:12
results and, to this extent, are broadly consistent with them. My estimated impacts in the
rst half of the sample are larger, and particularly so (by more than 1.0 p.p.) in the case of
budget-year shocks. This may be due to the fact that the methodology in this paper is freer
from a number of drawbacks that may have blurred the estimation of impacts in other studies.
Notably, the measure of scal policy used is arguably purged from endogeneity and anticipation,
estimation is carried out on the basis of high frequency data, and the e¤ects on impact and
over time are clearly di¤erentiated. The most important piece of evidence emerging from the
present study is, however, that the e¤ects of scal policy on interest rates have undergone a
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major structural change. The possibility of such a change has not been much emphasized, even
in more recent papers. Perotti (2004) is an exception in this respect, but his results are not
clear-cut.12
Having documented the responses of long-term interest rates, the next step it is to place
them against the full set of macroeconomic interactions following the realization of scal shocks.
I take up this point in the next section by considering their impacts in the framework of a system
of equations.
6 Macroeconomic interactions in the wake of scal shocks
The results in this section are based on a set of key macroeconomic variables including output,
ination and short- and long-term interest rates. Multivariate analogues of the univariate re-
gressions in the previous section are estimated. The analysis is now based on monthly data, the
highest frequency at which all series are available. Specically, I use industrial production for
output and the PPI of nished goods for prices, the variables typically showing up in monetary
policy VARs estimated at this frequency. The interest rates are the federal funds rate and the
10-year constant maturity rate. Let xt = [yt; pt; fft; rt]0 be a vector where yt is the output gap
measured as the detrended log of the IPI13, pt is ination measured as the change in the log of
the PPI for nished goods, and fft and rt are the monthly averages of, respectively, the short-
and long-term interest rates. Shocks are assigned to month t if there was one announcement in
the course of it; they are equal to 0 otherwise.14 The regressions include 12 lags, and correlated
12Perotti estimates a structural VAR on the basis of quaterly data, considering two subsamples: 1960:1-1979:4
and 1980:1-2001:4. He gets impacts on interest rates that are akwardly negative for both net taxes and spending
(and very small, in the range of -0.1 to -0.2 p.p.). Such results hold for the two subsamples considered. They seem
to underline the di¢ culties in using scal innovations derived from structural VAR to assess impacts on interest
rates.
13The log of the IPI was detrended by regressing it on a constant, a linear time trend and a squared time trend
(sample: 1950:01-2008:03). The residuals of this regression were taken as the output gap measure.
14Throughout the whole sample I have only one case of two shocks occuring during the same month: July 1979,
on the 12 and 31. As the second shock was on the last day of July, it was assigned to August 1979.
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shocks are controlled for, as in the previous section. For instance, the multivariate regressions
estimated to assess, respectively, the e¤ects of current-year decit, net tax and spending shocks
are:
xt= +
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i=1Bixt i +
P12
i=0id^
cy
t i +
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t i + "t, (5)
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where, as before, d^cyt and d^
by
t denote current- and budget-year decits shocks, and the same
notation applies to net tax (n^tcyt and n^t
by
t ) and expenditure (g^
cy
t and g^
by
t ) ones. This empirical
approach is similar to the one followed in Edelberg et al. (1999) and related literature.
Figure 4 shows the impacts of 1 percent of GDP decit shocks according to the sample
split considered before. The responses of output, short-term and long-term interest rates are
presented. The response of ination (not shown) uctuates irregularly around zero giving an
indication of essentially no impact.
To start with it is appropriate to check the consistency of the results for the long rate with
those obtained on the basis of the univariate regressions. Since a monthly frequency is still a
reasonably high one, the VAR procedure should lead to very similar ndings as when weekly
data are used. Note that the VAR procedure is somewhat more robust, in that it controls for
the past behavior of all variables in the system, and not only of the long rate. The results in the
two approaches are very consistent. The maximum impacts of the realization of decit shocks
in the period prior to 1988:12 are now about 0.6 and 1.8 p.p. for current- and budget-year
horizons, respectively, being close to the results on the basis of weekly data (0.8 and 1.8 p.p.).
In the post-1988:12 period, the gures are not far from zero in both procedures in the case of
current-year shocks. For their budget-year counterparts, the maximum impact goes down a bit
28
Output Long-term interest rate Federal funds rate
(a) Current year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
0 5 10 15 20
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
(a) Current year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(a) Current year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(b) Current year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
0 5 10 15 20
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
(b) Current year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(b) Current year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(c) Budget year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
0 5 10 15 20
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
(c) Budget year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(c) Budget year, 1969-1988
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(d) Budget year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
0 5 10 15 20
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
(d) Budget year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
(d) Budget year, 1989-2008
Months af ter announcement
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
0 5 10 15 20
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
Figure 4: Estimated macroeconomic responses to decit shocks (VAR based results)
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to -0.9 p.p. against -0.5 p.p. previously.
6.1 Fiscal shocks and the behavior of output
Figure 4 indicates that output reacts quickly to revisions to anticipated scal policy and the
responses seem to have undergone pretty much the same structural change as for interest rates.
This holds as well for net tax and spending shocks taken separately (1 percent of GDP size, as
before), whose impacts are shown in Figures 5 and 6. In the rst half of the sample, positive
decits shock raise output. In calculating the multipliers, one has to take into account that the
amplitude of economic uctuations is exacerbated by the use of the IPI instead of GDP as the
output indicator. A scale factor of 2 seems to measure fairly well the size of this e¤ect.15 The
multipliers - measured as the peak e¤ect - for current- and budget-year decit shocks are thus
around 1.0 and 2.0, respectively. This is consistent with the conjecture that markets respond
more strongly to the latter shocks. The trajectories of output following changes in anticipated
net taxes and spending are also in line with the Keynesian prior in the period before 1988:12,
being more precisely estimated in the rst case. The multipliers depend a bit on the forecasting
horizon underlying the shocks, but they are within the 1.5 to 2.0 range in absolute values. The
multiplier for current-year decit shocks is smaller than those for the respective components
because these attain the maximum impact at di¤erent points in time.
A point to stress is that output and long-term interest rates move in the same direction.
This is evidence against the hypothesis that only the nancial markets, not agents, are forward-
looking and that revisions to anticipated scal policy a¤ect aggregate demand only indirectly,
via interest rates. If this was the case, one would expect long-term interest rates to go up,
15The following procedure was used in order to come to this gure. GDP and the IPI in logs were rst detrended
by regressing them on a second-degree polynomial in time. Then, I took the values of the detrended variables
at all turning points of the NBER cycles contemporary with the sample period. I started at the December 1969
activity peak and ended in the December 2007 one. The average absolute change between each two consecutive
turning points was calculated. This yields 0.093 for the IPI and 0.042 for GDP.
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Figure 5: Estimated output responses to current-year scal shocks
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Figure 6: Estimated output responses to budget-year scal shocks
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depressing aggregate demand and output, at least temporarily, in the wake of positive decit
shocks.16 Contrary to these predictions, in the rst subsample decit shocks trigger positive
immediate e¤ects on output much as they do on interest rates.
The decit multipliers are negative in the second half of the sample, with gures of about
-0.5 for current-year shocks and a surprisingly one of -1.5 for their budget-year counterparts.
These estimates are statistically signicant. The large negative output response to changes
in anticipated decits for the budget year is driven by the depressing e¤ects of the spending
component, featuring a multiplier of around -3.5. Since these inferences are based on a reasonable
but not very large number of observations, in particular for budget-year horizons, estimates are
sensitive to inuential ones. In particular, the very large budget-year spending shock in July
1991 (1.7 percent of GDP), occurring in a period of sluggish growth shortly after the end of a
recession, is « inating» the estimated decrease in output. When this particular value is removed
(simply by setting it to 0), the output multiplier becomes approximately -2.8, still a rather large
gure nevertheless. Budget-year net tax shocks are expansionary but have milder e¤ects by
comparison, the multiplier being below 1. A greater impact of spending than net taxes is also
visible for impulses derived from current-year forecasts. Precise magnitudes apart, these results
lend strong credibility to the expansionary scal contraction hypothesis in the US over the last
two decades.
A possibility worth investigating is whether non-conventional e¤ects of scal policy were
already at work in the Reagan era. This issue was raised in relation to the 1981 tax cuts and
spending increases that coincided with the 1981-82 recession (see Blanchard (1984)), although
the policy stance in this period is complicated by the enactment of counteracting measures in
16This would happen because nancial markets would anticipate a rise in the short rate in line with the e¤ects
of scal loosening in a standard IS-LM framework (as formalized in Blanchard (1984) and Branson et al. (1985))
or, alternatively, in line with an expected response of the Federal Reserve o¤setting the expansion of output. The
«perverse» e¤ects on output would be temporary because, in principle, the actual implementation of the scal
stimulus later on would reverse them.
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1982. I am able to investigate indirectly the e¤ects of scal policy around the 1981-82 recession,
for instance, by recomputing the multipliers in the rst subsample excluding these two years
- the initial ones of Reagans rst term. When this is done, the output response (not shown)
shifts downward, indicating a Keynesian behavior of policy.
This is not the rst paper to indicate that the e¤ects of scal policy in the US may have
been, at least partially, at odds with the Keynesian prior in recent decades. Romer and Romer
(2007) show that increases in taxes to cope with an inherited decit, as opposed to increases
motivated by long-run growth considerations, have positive - albeit very imprecisely estimated -
e¤ects on output. SVAR measures of shocks document a weakening or a reversion (particularly
for net taxes) of the response of activity when the sample is broken around the eighties. This
possibility has been associated with scal policy in the Clinton era and, more recently, with
Bush II tax cuts.
The expansionary scal contraction hypothesis is linked to the so-called expectations view
of scal policy (see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)). A key ingredient is an increased awareness
of the governments long-run budget constraint, leading agents to expect that measures such
as tax cuts or spending increases be counteracted in the future. However, from the Ricardian
equivalence debate one may expect this awareness to weaken, or fully o¤set in the limit, the
impact of scal loosening on output, but not to reverse it. Theoretical contributions in the
area (see Giavazzi et al. (2000) for a survey) have emphasized that such e¤ects should be
associated with scal decisions taken in situations of very large budget imbalances, rendering
more likely the need for major and disruptive scal adjustments (or conversely, in the case
of policy tightening, eliminating or postponing this need). If the path of the current policy is
already seen as unsustainable, further loosening will be seen as particularly bad news. When the
adjustment is expected to come from the revenue side, Blanchard (1990) puts forward the idea
that agents may believe it will bring the tax rate above a certain threshold that implies a jump
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in the respective deadweight loss. More generally, a major scal consolidation on either side of
the budget will cause important variations in future income when implemented. An increased
probability that it occurs also means added uncertainty about that income, which may have
depressing e¤ects through precautionary savings and postponement of spending decisions.
This last channel would conceivably inuence directly long-term interest rates as well, as
market participants demanded a higher risk premium when buying bonds to make up for added
uncertainty. Actually, it is sometimes suggested that this is the mechanism behind expansionary
scal contractions. Credibility or reduced uncertainty e¤ects of scal tightening lower long
interest rates which, in turn, stimulate real activity (Alesina and Ardagna (1998)) - and the
opposite holds for scal loosening. This possibility builds on the aforementioned idea that
nancial markets react rst to changes in anticipated policy. Nevertheless, Figure 4 indicates
that in the post 1988:12 period, even in the presence of non-conventional e¤ects, output and
the long-term rate continue to move in the same direction. Fiscal loosening is accompanied by
a decrease in both variables, working as a negative aggregate demand shock. However, as the
response of the long rate is presumably partly determined by that of the short-term rate via the
expectations channel, perhaps this obscures a positive e¤ect, for instance, at the level of the risk
premium. I come back to this issue below.
The relevant question is to what extent the scal situation in the US over, say, the last two
decades was such that agents felt that a major adjustment was necessary in the near future.
This is a tricky question primarily because such expectations are largely impossible to proxy by
observable variables. It is appropriate at this point to distinguish them from anticipated scal
policy as it can be inferred with reasonable certainty from the budgetary documents for one or
two years ahead (precisely the point explored in this study in order to construct a measure of
scal shocks).17
17As it is known, longer-term budget projections are available but its usefulness in this respect is doubtfull (see
the discussion at the end of Section 2).
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It is beyond doubt that political debate came to reect growing concerns about scal sustain-
ability from the early- to mid-eighties. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Decit control Act
was enacted in 1985 and in the following years budget imbalances were often invoked to object
to expansionary policies. This was a change in comparison to some years back, and may signal
a parallel change in the beliefs of agents. When during the 1980 presidential campaign Reagan
put forward the proposal of a major tax cut, his opponent Carter objected on the grounds it
was inationary, not on budgetary grounds (Romer and Romer (2008)).
It seems reasonable to assume that consumers became more Ricardian over the time spanned
by the sample. On the one hand, liquidity constraints have eased in line with the development
of the capital market. Further, one may conjecture that recent experiences showing that govern-
ments scal position can change rapidly (also because it depends crucially on economic growth)
led agents to reckon with o¤setting measures not only within their lifespan but in the near future.
The seemingly comfortable scal position achieved in the late nineties in the US gave way in
not many years to large imbalances and revived concerns about budget sustainability. In short,
in the second half of the sample one can pinpoint conditions comparatively more propitious to
the occurrence of non-Keynesian e¤ects.
Looking at the evolution of budget indicators, Federal US debt grew very fast in the period
between 1982 and 1993, by about 25 p.p. of GDP (considering the debt held by the private
sector), reaching a peak around 50 per cent of GDP. This value was nevertheless below the
levels prevailing a couple of decades before, during the fties. The picture is thus one of a
sharp budget deterioration but hardly of a major crisis. And then there was an improvement
over the subsequent period that brought the debt ratio down by around 15 p.p.. The personal
income tax marginal rates were comparatively lower in the second half of the sample. Therefore,
my results document that scal policy can have non-conventional e¤ects under less extreme
budgetary positions than previously thought. But further research is needed to determine the
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precise mechanism at work.
Some literature dealing with the expansionary scal contraction hypothesis (e.g. Alesina and
Ardagna (1998) and Perotti (1999)) has suggested that larger shocks and shocks on the outlay
side are more likely to have non-Keynesian e¤ects. The larger negative spending multiplier in
the second subsample appears consistent with the second possibility. I can dig a bit further
into it since I have separate information about transfers. Accordingly I split net taxes into
its two components and consider the e¤ects separately. As it turns out, transfers are much
more predictable than taxes and spending, in particular in the second part of the sample on
which interest focus now. Consequently, the average absolute transfer shock in the post-1988
period is much smaller than for the other two budget items - by about one half - and the
variability is only 1/4 to 1/5 (budget-year shocks). The respective impulse-responses have
extremely wide condence bands (not shown), although the point estimate for positive transfer
impulses is negative. The response of taxes alone is very similar to that of net taxes, since tax
dominate transfer shocks in terms of magnitude and variability. On balance, in my results non-
conventional e¤ects are more prominent for spending impulses than for their tax counterparts,
while the evidence for transfers is not conclusive.
A nal word on the ination response. In principle, one would expect to nd signicant
impacts on ination accompanying the sizeable ones on output gap. This is not the case, however,
and experiments with the CPI as an alternative ination measure led to similar ndings. Such an
evidence can be seen as surprising, but it may just reect the sluggishness of price adjustment.
Below I address shortly the reaction of expected ination to my shock series.
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6.2 The impact on the federal funds rate and the behavior of monetary au-
thorities
The precise transmission of aggregate demands shocks and, in particular, scal shocks to the
short-term rate obviously depends on the way monetary policy is conducted. For most of the
sample period the behavior of the Federal Reserve is well described as having followed an interest
rate targeting procedure or a borrowed reserves one, implying similar consequences for the funds
rate in the presence of aggregate demand shocks. The short-term rate changes only as the Fed
becomes aware of the new developments in the economy and reacts to them. In view of this, the
movement in the same direction of the funds rate and output following the realization of positive
decit shocks in Figure 4 can generally be interpreted as reecting the endogenous response of
the policymaker to the deviation of output from trend. Considering the issue in more detail,
however, two possibilities arise as to the reaction of monetary authorities to scal shocks. They
may not react to scal news as such, but only to the ensuing output response. Alternatively
they may react directly to scal news, including what they forecast to be the impact on output
gap, and for instance tend to accommodate that impact to some extent. In the latter case, one
would expect this to weaken or perhaps reverse the standard upward response of the funds rate
following a positive deviation of output from trend in the rst subsample. Another issue to
consider is that the period from October 1979 to October 1982 marks a temporary change in
the Fed behavior, toward allowing the short-term rate to be determined by market forces. It
is thus appropriate to complement the evidence in Figure 4 by presenting the same responses
when the period 1979:10 to 1982:10 is excluded from the rst subsample (Figure 7).
I rst compare the responses of the federal funds rate to budget-year shocks in Figure 7 and
in panels (a) and (c) of Figure 4. They are markedly di¤erent and consistent with the change
in the Fed operating procedures. In the wake of positive aggregate demand shocks, if the Fed
does not adjust non-borrowed reserves, there will be a quicker and possibly sharper rise in the
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Figure 7: Estimated macroeconomic responses to decit shocks excluding the years of the
Volcker experiment
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money market rate than otherwise. In the rst case, the funds rate begins to go up about one
month after impact, up to around 3 p.p. four months out (the peak impact is 3.7 p.p.). In
contrast, in the second case the money market rate falls slightly during the rst three months
and only then starts to increase. The peak impact is only about 1.4 p.p.. Given that the years
of the Volcker experiment span only a fraction of the rst subsample, but its exclusion implies a
substantial modication of the short-term rate response, this implicitly indicates a huge upward
movement in the variable during the period. These results give a measure of the role played
by the Federal Reserve as far as stabilization of interest rates is concerned. Note that the rise
in the funds rate is considerably muted following current-year shocks in the pre-1988:12 data
(when the years 1979-1982 are excluded there is no rise at all). This di¤erence in the behavior
vis-a-vis their budget-year counterparts is di¢ cult to explain, since current-year shocks have a
sizeable positive impact on output gap.
The negative trajectory of the funds rate in the initial months after the budget-year shocks
in Figure 7, along with a rise in output approximately since impact, could signal some accom-
modation of scal shocks by monetary authorities in the rst subsample. But the initial fall is
small, being di¢ cult to draw rm conclusions. Moreover, the magnitude of the peak change in
output gap (around 2.0 percent)18 and in the funds rate (1.4 p.p.) imply a sensitivity to the
business cycle somewhat over 0.5. This appears to be a sensible gure in the light of previous
studies (see Clarida et al. (2000)).
In the period post-1988:12, there is an initial stickiness in the funds rate in the wake of
budget-year shocks, lasting for about ve months before it goes down in line with the widening
of the negative output gap. In this case, however, the response is very consistent with the
trajectory of output, rather subdued as well for those initial months. The degree of sensitivity
to the cyclical variable implied by the results is now greater than 1.0. Although an increase in
18Considering, as before, a factor of 1/2 to scale output gap from industrial production to GDP.
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this parameter in the second subsample is consistent with what other studies have found, the
gure is a bit above those usually computed. It is worth noting that in either of the subsamples
there might be other factors at work, such as a positive reaction of the short rate to the long
nominal rate, a possibility raised by Mehra (1997).
7 More on the impact of scal policy on long-term bond yields
7.1 Impact on the risk premium
Figures 4 and 7 indicate that the 10-year note rate accompanies the trajectory of the funds rate in
a muted way in both subsamples. This sort of prole appears to reect the dampening impact of
the expectations channel, given the temporary nature of the federal funds rate response against
the duration of the long-term bond. Simulations of simple macroeconomic models including, in
particular, a monetary policy rule and a term structure relationship (such as in Walsh (1995, Ch.
10)) also predict a muted behavior of the long rate following changes in the federal funds rate.
This suggests that uncertainty or credibility e¤ects as stressed by the literature on expansionary
scal contractions are best searched at the level of the risk premium. Markets expectations of
the nominal short-term rate and risk premia are unobservable. The method I use to disentangle
these two components is to proxy expectations through projections drawn from a reduced-form
VAR. The risk premium is computed as the spread between the actual yield of the long bond
and the yield implied by the pure expectations theory.
I denote by r^t the expectations component of the long-term interest rate, equal to the
weighted average of markets expectation of the federal funds rate (Etfft+j) over the holding
period of the long bond: r^t =
PN 1
j=0 !jEtfft+j , where the !j are weights. I posit further that
agentsexpectations are formed on the basis of a reduced-form system comprising the variables
in xt = [yt; pt; fft; rt]0. They are thus obtained on a pure forecasting exercise basis. The federal
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funds rate is taken as a proxy for 1-month maturity, meaning that N is equal to 120 months,
in order to span the life of the 10-year note. Then r^t can be written as a linear projection on a
constant and current values and lags (the original number of lags in the system minus 1, 11 in
this case) of the variables in xt. The coe¢ cients of the projection are complicated functions of
the reduced-form VAR coe¢ cients and the weights, but they can be easily retrieved in practice
from a regression of r^t on a constant and current and lagged xt (which yields an exact t).
The term premium, denoted by st, is obtained as a residual from the identity rt  r^t+st. The
empirical strategy is to use this identity and the expression of r^t as a linear projection to write
rt as a function of the variables in xt = [yt; pt; fft; st]0. Then, in the original VAR equations
used to compute the e¤ects of scal policy shocks - in (5) above - to replace rt by the derived
expression, and rewrite as a system in xt . The latter is then used to compute the reaction of
the term premium to shocks. The general approach followed here borrows from Bernanke et al.
(1997), and I use their method for computing the weights. These are given by !j =
jPN 1
j=0
j
,
and the monthly discount factor by  = 0:997.
A technicality arises at this point. When the long-rate is replaced by its expression in terms
of the variables in xt , the resulting system corresponding to (5) has a di¤erent structure, in
that it has a longer lag length for the rst three variables in xt and the scal shocks, and the
disturbances are autocorrelated.19 In order to save degrees of freedom and not to complicate
the estimation, I impose the necessary restrictions (e.g. the lags beyond the 12th are excluded)
on the system used to assess the e¤ects of the shocks on xt , so that it has the same structure as
(5). The results below conrm that this is a good approximation since the responses for the two
components roughly add up to the overall response of the long rate. Note that the impact on the
19 Illustrating this point more formally: let the projection yielding r^t be given by r^t =
P11
i=0 
1
iL
irt +P11
i=0 
2
iL
ix+t , where x
+
t = [yt; pt; fft]: Then, from the relationship rt  r^t + st, rt = (1   10  P11
i=1 
1
iL
i) 1(
P11
i=0 
2
iL
ix+t + st). Substituting this expression into, say, the rst equation in the system (5)
for yt, one gets the corresponding equation in the new system which has the form yt = a+
P23
i=1bix
+
t i +P12
i=1 cist i +
P23
i=0did^
cy
t i +
P23
i=0eid^
ny
t i +
P11
i=0fi"
y
t i.
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Figure 8: Response of the long-term rate following decit shocks: term premium and
expectations component
expectations component is simply calculated by replacing the original impacts on the variables
in xt, for each period ahead, into the expression for r^t. In order to account for the possibility
of a structural change in the way expectations were formed over time, I estimated separately
the underlying reduced-form VAR for each of the two subsamples that are being considered
throughout the paper.
Figure 8 presents the impacts of budget-year decit shocks of 1 percent of GDP broken down
by the two components of the long rate. The rst thing to note is that the trajectories of the
long rate consistent with the pure expectations hypothesis are even more muted than the actual
responses. This reects the smoothing e¤ect induced by the stationarity of the VAR which
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brings the forecast of the funds rate close to its unconditional mean for an important part of the
lifespan of the long bond. This unconditional mean di¤ers substantially in the two subsamples,
being around is 8.5 percent in the rst one and 2.9 percent in the second.
As far as the impact of decit shocks is concerned, both the expectations component and the
term premium rise in the rst subsample. They account for, respectively, about 1/3 and 2/3 of
the total movement in the long rate. The opposite happens in the second subsample for which
both variables fall in the wake of the same shock, each justifying about 1/2 of the overall response.
If investors were sensitive to the increased uncertainty brought about by scal loosening in a
context of concern about budget sustainability, then a particularly large positive reaction of the
risk premium would be expected in the second subsample. This is, however, contradicted by the
response depicted in Figure 8. Other standard justications for term premia as, for instance,
that decits put pressure on the demand for long-term bonds, pushing the respective interest
rate upward relative to the short rate, would lead to positive responses in both periods. In
short, the results for the term premium seem indirectly driven by the impact of budget shocks
on aggregate demand, not to aspects specically linked to scal policy.20 Naturally these ndings
are conditional on the ability of reduced-form VARs to capture properly markets expectations
of the short-term rate, which has been questioned (see Rudebusch et al. (2007)).
7.2 Impact on expected ination
Older literature used to emphasize a related (and observationally equivalent) mechanism as
far as the response of the long-term interest rate to scal policy was concerned. This was the
hypothesis that monetary policy would ultimately bear the burden of protracted scal imbalances
through decit monetization. The argument is in its essence similar to the one underlying the
20 It is beyond the scope of this paper to interpret the connection between the movements in aggregate demand
and those in the term premium. This is a controversial issue, for which it is not even established whether there
should be a positive or a negative association between them.
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expansionary scal contraction hypothesis. In the rst case, the adjustment is expected to take
place through accommodating monetary policy. In the second case, it comes by a disruptive
change in the course of scal policy. The fact that decit monetization became a less considered
possibility may reect the added credibility that monetary authorities gained in terms of their
commitment to ght ination. Studies in that vein such as Brunner (1986) argued similarly
to above that larger decits would lead to a rise in the risk premium of long bonds, reecting
markets uncertainty about the prole of future ination. They considered in addition an e¤ect
going in the same direction on the level of future ination. I now investigate this last point. One
could proxy ination expectations through a VAR procedure as the one used to obtain the term
premium (splitting short-term nominal rate expectations into expected ination and a residual
supposed to reect short-term real rate expectations). I prefer, however, to bring in additional
independent information about expected ination coming from a survey.
Among surveys that ask responders to quantify their ination expectations, the one most
useful in our context is the Michigan Survey of Households because it has higher frequency data,
namely, on monthly basis. Unfortunately the series starts only in 1978 and thus I restrict the
investigation of the impacts to the second subsample (on which anyway interest focus now). A
drawback of the Michigan Survey is that people are asked about the expected change in prices
during the coming 12 months not, say, up to ten years ahead. It seems nevertheless reasonable to
think that if there is an e¤ect on expected ination, this will emerge in the responses whatever the
horizon asked. The impact of decit shocks on expected ination, measured in percentage points
(annualized), are shown in Figure 9. They were obtained on the basis of univariate regressions,
analogous to (2) but with monthly data (thus 12 lags of the regressors were included).
Expected ination rises following an upward revision to anticipated decits, the response
being very small for current-year shocks but reasonably large for their budget-year counterparts
(the peak is close to 1 p.p.). These responses contrast with the imprecisely estimated and
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Figure 9: Response of expected ination to decit shocks
essentially zero ones of current ination and thus do not appear to be induced by them. On
balance, this is the only piece of evidence I get suggesting a positive e¤ect on nominal long-term
interest rates of policy loosening in the post-1988 period.
8 Concluding remarks
This study developed a new measure of scal shocks based on changes to anticipated scal policy
and drew inferences about its impact on the economy. While in the rst subsample running
from 1969 to 1988 the results are quite consistent with Keynesian textbook predictions, they
change substantially in the two subsequent decades ending in 2008, during which scal policy is
found to have sizeable perverse e¤ects on output. The ndings in this more recent period put
clearly a question mark on the use of discretionary scal policy as a stabilizing toll. They are
troubling against the background of the recent recession where scal policy has been called to
play an important anti-recessionary role. Indeed, governments in the US and elsewhere have
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implemented stimulus packages of considerable sizes, but the evidence presented here generally
questions their e¤ectiveness.
The key question arising is: are such perverse e¤ects inherent to the use of scal policy in the
current macroeconomic setting or do they have to do with specic aspects of the policy design?
Indeed, in contrast with monetary policy, scal policy can be designed in multiple ways, in terms
of which and how budget items are a¤ected. Nevertheless, as Auerbach (2009) points out, little
progress has been made in recent years toward improving such design. This is explained by the
fact that almost a consensus had emerged that the countercyclical role of the government budget
should be left to automatic stabilizers rather than discretionary measures. Research should be
directed to the mechanisms at work behind non-conventional impacts of scal policy on output
in recent decades and whether specic features of the way it is conducted are bringing them
about.
9 Appendix on data availability
Concerning scal data, the only availability gap concerned the post-budget year projections
in the last announcement before the submission of a new budget, which could be used only
from FY 1998 on. On the one hand, these started to be published only toward the middle of
the sample. On the other hand, I had only partial access to the elements in the Mid-Session
Reviews prior to FY 1998 (note that this study was carried out on the basis of resources on the
web), not including such projections. This latter aspect, however, precluded the computation
of only about 10 observations in the series of budget-year shocks.
Concerning the macroeconomic assumptions, three main availability shortcomings had to
be tackled. The rst one stemmed from the fact that the macroeconomic scenario underlying
budget forecasts is not presented on a scal year basis. It takes instead the calendar year as a
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reference or, more often, in the case of real and price growth, the change fourth quarter to fourth
quarter. Real and price GNP/GDP growth on a scal year basis were derived using the following
strategy. I considered real-time quarterly data, up to the time the projection was drawn (taken
from the relevant issue of the Economic Indicators) and drew quarterly forecasts for the periods
ahead in such a way to be consistent with the administrations yearly (or fourth quarter over
fourth quarter) growth rate. More specically, I took the growth rate (year-on-year) of the last
quarter available and assumed a constant increment of this rate from one quarter to the other
within each calendar year. A similar procedure was followed for the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
but taking the level of the variable.
A second issue was that, while I always had the macroeconomic forecasts underlying budget
submissions, for the remaining announcements this was not the case before 1992 (except for the
years 1988-89). This was partly due to the aforementioned lack of access to the full text of the
Mid-Session Reviews during an important part of the sample. However, for some announcements
in the initial years, in particular those not backed by documents, the underlying macroeconomic
assumptions may not be retrievable anymore. For the announcements in which the assumptions
were missing, they were proxied by considering rstly the real-time quarterly data contemporary
with the release. Then, the real and price GNP/GDP growth (and the level of the short-term
interest rate) for a given quarter ahead were calculated as a weighted average of the gures for
the same quarter in the announcements before and after for which the assumptions were known.
Additional di¢ culties were faced in the period prior to FY 1976, for which only assumptions
for the current calendar year were given in the budget documents. Moreover, no projection for
the 3-month Treasury bill rate was given at all. Note that, in this period, the current calendar
year ran until the middle of the upcoming scal year which started in July, 1. Thus I had to
extend the procedures just described in order to obtain gures for the two missing quarters of
the budget scal year. In the case of GNP real growth and deator, I simply assumed the same
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growth rate (year-on-year) as obtained for the fourth quarter of the current calendar year. In the
case of the short-term rate, given the absence of a projection, I set all quarters ahead equal to the
average of the last two quarters known at the time of the announcement. For the announcements
during the period 1968-74, I then included in regression (1) a dummy variable interacting with
the short-term interest rate projection, in order to allow it not to have an impact on the scal
forecast.
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